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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010952-CA 
v. : 
GARRY S. DUPONT : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for interference with a peace officer making an 
arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(Supp.2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict on the 
interference with arrest charge in the face of compelling evidence of defendant's guilt? 
Whether or not trial counsel was ineffective is a question of law. State v. Silva, 2000 
UT App 292,112,13 P.3d 604. However, in the context of this case, this Court's resolution 
of the ineffectiveness question depends on whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
a motion for a directed verdict. "[AJppellate courts should 'uphold the trial court's decision 
if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the 
court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Taylor, 884 
P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in giving a flight instruction where the defendant, 
after seeing an officer discover drugs in his car and after hearing the officer instruct a deputy 
to detain him, ignored the detective's order to stop and took off running until officers caught 
up to him. 
The trial court's decision to issue a flight instruction is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, f7, 987 P.2d 1281. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statute is pertinent to the disposition of this case: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999) - Interference with arresting officer: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one 
count of interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999) (R. 2-3). Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop (R. 39-47). After a hearing 
the court denied the motion (R. 214; 284:46). Following a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted of interference with a peace officer making an arrest and acquitted of both counts 
of possession of a controlled substance (R. 255-56,286:281). The court sentenced defendant 
to six months in prison but suspended the sentence. The court placed defendant on probation 
for one year if he remained in Utah (R. 262; 287:6). Defendant timely appealed (R. 263). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On March 23,2000, Salt Lake Police Officer Tracy Wyant seized 600 milligrams of 
methamphetamine and 3.6 grams of marijuana from a black shaving kit in defendant's car 
(R. 286:82-83, 95, 191-93). Upon finding the drugs, Officer Wyant told Deputy Knighton 
to detain defendant (R. 286:95, 133, 142). Defendant did not wait for Deputy Knighton to 
detain him, but took off running (R. 286:95, 133-34, 142). Officer Wyant yelled to the 
defendant to stop and the officers gave chase (R. 286:96,142-43 ). When they came within 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f2, 12 P.3d 92. 
3 
three to four feet of defendant he stopped and said, "I give, I give!" and the officers arrested 
him (R. 286:96, 134). 
Before the Arrest: The Stake Out 
Officer Wyant first saw defendant during surveillance of a documented drug house 
at 5405 South Northwest Avenue in Kearns, Utah (R. 286:83-84). The house was the 
residence of Laurie Lund, who had an extensive drug history (R. 286:115). Defendant's car 
was parked in front of the house, and defendant was walking back and forth between his car 
and the house (R. 286:84). Defendant had the rear hatch of the car open and appeared to be 
working on the car (R. 286:84-85). Eventually, Lund came out of the house and got into the 
car on the passenger's side, and defendant drove away (R. 286:85, 92). Officer Wyant 
followed the couple in an unmarked patrol car (R. 286:86). When defendant brought his car 
to a stop at the first stoplight, Officer Wyant noticed that the left taillight of defendant's car 
did not illuminate (R. 286:86). After passing through the intersection, Officer Wyant 
activated his siren and lights and signaled defendant to stop (R. 286:87). Defendant 
maneuvered his car into a strip mall parking lot and stopped (R. 286:87). 
The Traffic Stop 
Officer Wyant approached defendant's car and requested defendant's driver's license, 
registration, and insurance card (R. 286:87). Defendant produced all three; however, the 
insurance card was expired (R. 286:87). Defendant assured Officer Wyant that the car was 
insured, so Officer Wyant left to check defendant's license and registration while defendant 
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searched for a valid insurance card (R. 286:88). When he returned to his patrol car, Officer 
Wyant radioed for backup (R. 286:88). While verifying defendant's license and registration, 
Officer Wyant telephoned defendant's insurance company and learned that defendant's 
insurance had expired two weeks earlier (R. 186:88). After Deputy Knighton arrived to 
provide backup, Officer Wyant again approached defendant and asked him to step from the 
car to discuss the insurance (R. 286:89). Defendant complied and Officer Wyant frisked 
defendant for weapons and then escorted him to the passenger seat of his patrol car (R. 
286:90). Deputy Knighton remained outside to watch Lund, who remained in defendant's 
car (R. 286:89, 92). 
Officer Wyant informed defendant that he was citing him for failure to insure his car 
and that once defendant signed the citation defendant was free go, although his car would be 
impounded (R. 286:91).2 Defendant complied and signed the citation (R. 286:91). Officer 
Wyant then offered to retrieve any personal items from defendant's car. Defendant asked for 
his tools and clothing (R. 286:91 -92). Officer Wyant and defendant exited the patrol car, and 
Officer Wyant began to inventory defendant's car (R. 286:93). Lund had already spoken to 
Deputy Knighton and left the area with his consent (R. 286:92). 
The Inventory Search and Defendant's Flight 
During the inventory search of defendant's car, Officer Wyant retrieved the personal 
2
 Officer Wyant testified that it was unlawful to operate an uninsured vehicle and 
that it was the policy of the Salt Lake Sheriffs Department to impound uninsured 
vehicles under a State Tax Impound (R. 286:93). See Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-301(2)(a). 
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items that defendant had requested (R. 286:92). Officer Wyant also discovered a black 
shaving kit on the back seat on the driver's side (R. 286:93-94). Defendant, standing only 
six feet away, immediately yelled, "Give me my shaving bag. Give me my shaving bag" (R. 
286:94, 130). Officer Wyant, concerned that the shave kit could contain a weapon, did not 
immediately hand the kit over to defendant, but instead inspected the kit as he leaned into 
the back seat area of defendant's car (R. 286:94-95). Inside the shave kit, Officer Wyant 
found what appeared to be methamphetamine in a small Tupperware container and marijuana 
in a clear plastic bag (R. 286:95).3 Defendant asserted, "Those items aren't mine" (R. 
286:102, 132-33). Officer Wyant leaned out of the car and told Deputy Knighton to detain 
defendant (R. 286:95,133,142). At that point, defendant took off running (R. 286:95,133-
34, 142). Officer Wyant yelled at defendant to stop, but defendant continued to flee (R. 
286:96, 142-43, 146). The officers then chased defendant (R. 286:96,142-43 ). When the 
officers caught up to within three to four feet of defendant, he stopped and said, "I give, I 
give" (R. 286:96, 134). Defendant made it about thirty feet away from the scene of the 
traffic stop before surrendering to the officers (R. 286:134, 144-45). 
The officers arrested and booked defendant on two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance and one count of interference with a peace officer making an arrest (R. 
2-3, 286:96, 134, 143). Officer Wyant completed his inventory of defendant's car. In the 
3
 The Utah state crime lab later determined that the Tupperware contained 660 
milligrams of methamphetamine and the plastic bag contained 3.6 grams of marijuana (R. 
286:191-93). 
6 
shaving kit he discovered a glass pipe with what appeared to be residue and a cut v-shaped 
straw, which he knew from experience was used for methamphetamine (R. 286:99-100). 
Procedural facts relevant to issues on appeal 
At the end of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the 
possession charges on the ground that the evidence of possession was insufficient to send to 
the jury (R. 286:222-226). The court denied this motion (R. 286:234). During trial, the state 
submitted a flight instruction (R. 244,286:229). Defendant objected, claiming that the short 
distance defendant ran was insufficient evidence of flight to warrant an instruction and that 
the conduct constituting flight "encompassed itself within the charge" of interference with 
a peace officer making an arrest (R. 286:229-231, 238). The State replied that the law 
provides no minimum distance a defendant must cover before he is considered to be in flight 
and that evidence defendant attempted to evade the officers, for however brief a distance, 
constituted flight (R. 286:229-31). The court determined that the language of the instruction 
conformed with both the Utah Supreme Court's holding on the subject and the evidence 
presented at trial (R. 286:238). The court overruled defendant's objection and read the 
instruction to the jury (R. 286:238,250). Defendant was acquitted of the possession charges, 
but was found guilty of interference with a peace officer making an arrest (R. 262,286:281, 
287:6). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Trial counsel was not deficient in not moving for a directed verdict on the interference 
charge. First, in light of counsel's motions for directed verdicts on the possession of 
methamphetamine and marijuana charges, counsel's failure to similarly challenge the 
sufficiency of evidence on the interference charge appears to have been deliberate. 
Additionally, defendant has failed to develop any record through a rule 23B hearing that 
might explain his counsel's reasonable actions. Moreover, the State adduced some evidence 
on each element of the interference charge, particularly that defendant was aware that he was 
under arrest and that he disobeyed an order from a peace officer effecting the arrest. As the 
evidence was sufficient, trial counsel was not deficient for not choosing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
POINT II 
The trial court properly issued the flight instruction. There was clear evidence that 
defendant fled the scene immediately after he recognized that police had discovered 
contraband in his shaving kit and had commanded that he be detained. From these facts the 
jury could have inferred that defendant was conscious of his guilt of all charges. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE INTERFERENCE WITH ARREST 
CHARGE IN THE FACE OF COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
Although defendant first argues that the evidence supporting the interference charge 
was insufficient to send to the jury, he concedes that he did not preserve this claim below. 
Aplt. Br. at 2. Defendant claims, however, that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, defendant claims that trial 
counsel's decision not to move for a directed verdict "falls below an objectively reasonable 
standard of professional care given the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346." Aplt. Br. at 16. Without further analysis, defendant concludes 
that the decision could not be a trial strategy because trial counsel was aware of evidentiary 
weaknesses in the interference charge as evidenced by his objection to the flight instruction. 
Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant further asserts that counsel's conduct was prejudicial because the 
evidence was, in fact, insufficient. Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant's argument fails on both parts. 
A. Standard of review and burden of proof required 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 
"The benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686 
9 
(1984). To establish that he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, defendant must prove two elements. Defendant must first identify the specific 
acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-88,690; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 
966 (1984). In proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, defendant must rebut "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland466 U.S. at 689. This presumption arises from 
the requirement that "every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. The Court must give counsel wide latitude to 
make tactical decisions and "will not question strategic decisions unless there exists 'no 
reasonable basis' for the decision." Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1985) 
{quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993)). 
Nothing in an attorney's duty to provide effective assistance of counsel mandates the 
attorney to make futile motions or objections. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41 f 26, 1 P.3d 546 
("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."); 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he failure of counsel to make 
motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
10 
assistance/') (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)). Where the State has 
presented some evidence from which a jury could find each element of the crime proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel is not ineffective for choosing to not the challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, f 19, 42 P.3d 1248; see also 
State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24,30 (Iowa 1999) (holding that evidence of LSD distribution 
was sufficient, insufficiency claim would have been meritless, and counsel was not 
ineffective for not raising claim where State presented some evidence that defendant gave 
hits of LSD to third party); State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638-39 (Iowa 2000) (holding 
that counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge sufficiency of evidence where State 
had presented some evidence on each element of charge); cf. Utah R. of Prof. Conduct 3.1 
("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous," but lawyer for criminal defendant 
"may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be 
established"). 
To prevail on the second element, defendant must prove that "the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. See also, Parsons, 871 
P.2d at 522. "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "The 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 
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Failure to show prejudice constitutes an independent ground on which to deny relief for an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996). 
The defendant's burdens of proof in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are 
further magnified by his duty to .assure an adequate record on appeal. State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76,116,12 P.3d 92. Defendants may not rely on speculation to support allegations 
of ineffective assistance, but must prove that the ineffective assistance is a "demonstrable 
reality." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 526; Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1991). 
"[WJhere the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f 17. 
B. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel 
performed unprofessionally in not moving for a 
directed verdict on the interference with arrest charge. 
Defendant points to no specific facts in the record to demonstrate the first prong of 
Strickland, that trial counsel was ineffective. Rather, defendant makes the unprecedented 
assertion that Holgate requires counsel to always challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant also generally asserts that "[t]here is no conceivable advantage 
in refraining from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence." Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's 
argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would make any failure to challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence per se deficient performance by counsel. Defendant's reasoning is contrary 
to Strickland and its progeny. 
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First, defendant ignores that not every decision at trial must result in an "advantage" 
for defendant. Trial counsel has no duty to raise futile motions and, indeed, is prohibited by 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct from making frivolous motions. See State v. Kelley, 
2000 UT 41426,1 P.3d 546; Utah R.ofProf. Conduct 3.1. Thus, where there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction, counsel cannot be deficient for not challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,1(11, 42 P.3d 1248. In this 
case, there was more than ample evidence to support defendant's conviction for interfering 
with a peace officer making an arrest. See discussion infra Pt. I.C. 
Second, defendant's construction of HoIgate would render moot the requirement from 
Strickland that the court "determine whether, in the light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. 466 U.S. at 690. Holgate merely held that challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence must, like any other error, be preserved by proper objection at trial. 2000 UT 74, 
at f 16. Where trial counsel does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing 
court must still determine if, under the totality of the circumstances, the omission constituted 
objectively deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
Third, defendant's use of Holgate contravenes the well-established presumption that 
trial counsel's conduct "might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 (quoting Michel 
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Defendant concludes that because trial counsel 
challenged the flight instruction, he was aware of evidentiary weaknesses in the interference 
13 
charge, and therefore, his decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence could not 
have been trial strategy. Aplt. Br. 16-17. Such reasoning demonstrates only that, in 
hindsight, defendant believes that grounds may have existed on which to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Contra State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah App. 1993) 
("'[A]ppellate review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, otherwise, the 
"distorting effects of hindsight" would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-
guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record.'") (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689). Thus, absent a record elucidating trial counsel's strategy, 
such reasoning fails to show that the decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
was due to trial counsel's incompetence. 
In fact, trial counsel' s conduct at trial evidenced a purposeful decision not to challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence. Trial counsel very deliberately objected to the flight 
instruction based on the sufficiency of the evidence of flight (R. 286:229-30). Trial counsel's 
equally deliberate, able, and contemporaneous challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on 
the possession of marijuana and methamphetamine charges (R. 286:222-26) shows that he 
intentionally rejected, rather than negligently omitted, challenging the interfering charge on 
grounds of insufficiency of evidence.4 
4
 Trial counsel correctly recognized that because the drug charges were based only 
on a theory of constructive possession they could be legitimately challenged on a motion 
for a directed verdict. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah 1985) (holding that 
drug possession conviction may be based on actual or constructive possession). Finding 
constructive possession of drugs requires proving "a sufficient nexus between the accused 
14 
First, gi\ en that defendant's "flight" is the culpable act constituting the offense of interfering, 
counsel might reasonably have chosen not to move for a directed verdict on the interference 
charge when he failed to persuade the tnal court to omit the flight instruction. Moreover, 
while tnal counsel was evidently willing to challenge the flight instruction because it could 
only have suggested to the jury his guilty intent on the possession charges, he might 
reasonably have considered a motion for a directed verdict on the interference charge to be 
so futile that it would have been absurd and personally discrediting to assert it.5 
and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drug." Id. at 619. "The existence of a sufficient 
nexus to prove constructive possession is a highly fact-sensitive determination." State v 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, U 14, 985 P.3d 911 (Utah 1999). In moving for a directed verdict 
on the possession charges, tnal counsel persuasively argued that the evidence supporting 
the possession charges was insufficient because 1) defendant was not alone in the car, 2) 
defendant made no incnminating statements, 3) defendant acted normally up to the point 
that the drugs were discovered, 4) defendant did not attempt to sell the drugs, 5) 
defendant was not using the drugs, 6) the drugs were in a shaving bag that supposedly 
belonged to defendant, but had not been presented in court, and 7) the drugs were m the 
backseat of the car nearly equidistant between defendant and the passenger (R. 286:222-
25). Tnal counsel also presented the court with three cases with similar facts to the 
present case m which convictions had been reversed on appeal for lack of sufficient 
evidence to support constructive possession. See Layman, 1999 UT 79 at f 16; Fox, 709 
P.2d at 320; State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Ut App. 1991). Defendant thus had 
both law and facts to support a directed verdict on the possession charge. 
5
 The evidence of the charge of interference was amply sufficient to send to the 
jury As discussed below, the State presented uncontroverted evidence through the 
testimony of Officer Wyant that defendant knew Deputy Knighton was going to arrest 
him and that defendant ignored Officer Wyant's command to stop and fled the scene (R. 
286:93-96, 132-33, 141-43). The trial court, which has a measure of discretion m 
submitting charges to the jury, obviously found the evidence sufficient to send to the jury. 
See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11 (stating that under plain error analysis of unpreserved 
claim of insufficient evidence, defendant must show that trial court erred in submitting 
case to the jury). The sufficiency of the evidence is further bolstered by the fact that 
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"Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their appeals, including the 
burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the record." See Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, at ff 15, 17 (recognizing that rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, was 
"specifically designed to address the inadequate record dilemma" in cases of alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel) (citations omitted). Defendant on appeal did not move for 
a rule 23B hearing in this case. 
Because defendant has failed to develop any record that might explain why trial 
counsel did not move for a directed verdict on the interfering charge, when he so deliberately 
moved for directed verdicts on the possession charges, this Court should not attempt to 
"second guess" trial counsel's actions. Rather, the Court must presume that counsel's actions 
were deliberate, reasonable trial strategy. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f 17 ("Where the record 
appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will 
be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.") Consequently, this 
Court should find that trial counsel affirmatively chose not to preserve a challenge to the 
sufficiency of evidence on the interference with arrest charge and decline to consider the 
merits of defendant's challenge on appeal. In any event, defendant has failed to satisfy the 
second Strickland prong, that his trial counsel' s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to move for 
defendant was unable to argue insufficiency on appeal without misrepresenting the record 
and omitting evidence. See discussion infra, Pt. I.C. and Aplt Br. at 11. As the evidence 
was sufficient to send to the jury, trial counsel could not have been deficient in foregoing 
a motion for directed verdict. 
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a directed verdict was prejudicial. 
C. The decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence on the interference charge did not prejudice 
defendant because the evidence was sufficient. 
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because the evidence allegedly was 
insufficient and, following this argument to its unstated conclusion, had trial counsel 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the motion would have been granted, thus 
relieving defendant of the interference charge. Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant's argument fails 
because his recitation of the evidence is incomplete. Specifically, he failed to marshal two 
crucial facts: 1) Detective Wyant twice testified that he"told" Deputy Knighton to detain 
defendant, (R. 286:133, 142);6 and 2) defendant, after yelling to Officer Wyant, "Give me 
my shaving bag," saw Officer Wyant open the bag and then said, "Those items aren't mine" 
(R. 286:130, 132-33).7 
6
 As defendant notes, see Aplt. Br. at 10, Officer Wyant first testified that he 
"motioned" to Deputy Knighton to detain defendant. During cross-examination and 
redirect examination, however, he twice stated that he "told" Deputy Knighton to detain 
defendant (R. 286:95, 133, 142). Inconsistencies in a witness's testimony pertain to 
weight and credibility, which are "the exclusive function of the jury." State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 
1979) ("The function of this Court 'is not to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to 
give conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testimony.'") (citation omitted). "When reviewing a trial wherein conflicting, 
competent evidence was presented, we simply 'assume that the jury believed the evidence 
supporting the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 14, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1213 (Utah 1993)). 
7
 At trial, Officer Wyant did not recall defendant making this statement until after 
he was arrested (R. 286:132). However, trial counsel proffered the statement from 
Deputy Knighton's report during cross-examination (R. 286:132-33). The State did not 
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"[Ajppellate courts should 'uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the 
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the court] conclude[s] that 
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime 
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296 (citation omitted) 
(alteration in original). A person commits the crime of interference with a peace officer 
making an arrest "if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person 
or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:.. . (2) the arrested person's refusal 
to perform any act required by lawful order: (a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; 
and (b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
305 (1999). Thus, the evidence of the interference charge is only insufficient if, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, reasonable minds could entertain a 
reasonable doubt that either defendant did not know that the officers were trying to arrest him 
or defendant did not disobey a lawful order from the officers.8 
The properly marshaled evidence, including the above facts ignored by defendant, is 
as follows: Officer Wyant observed defendant operating a car with a malfunctioning taillight 
object to the statement and neither party requested a limiting instruction, so that the 
statement was considered substantively by the jury. See State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 
157 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that limiting instruction not appropriate where hearsay is 
admitted without objection). Defendant has not claimed error on this point on appeal. 
8
 Defendant does contest parts (a) or (b) of the statute, namely, that Officer Wyant 
was a peace officer involved in the arrest and that the officer's conduct and commands 
were necessary to effect the arrest. 
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(R. 286:86). He initiated a traffic stop, during which he learned that defendant's car was 
uninsured (R. 286:88). Officer Wyant explained to defendant that he was free to go, but that 
his car was going to be impounded (R. 286:91). He offered to retrieve defendant's personal 
belongings from the car (R. 286:91). During an inventory search of defendant's car, Officer 
Wyant discovered a black shaving kit that defendant had not asked for (R. 286:93-94). 
Defendant, standing about six feet away, immediately yelled to Officer Wyant, "Give me my 
shaving bag. Give me my shaving bag" (R. 286:94). Officer Wyant, concerned that the bag 
might contain a weapon, inspected the bag and discovered what appeared to be 
methamphetamine and marijuana (R. 286:95). Defendant immediately said, "Those items 
aren't mine" (R. 286:132-33). Officer Wyant then leaned out of the car and told Deputy 
Knighton to detain defendant (R. 286:133,42). Defendant took off running (R. 286:95,133-
34, 142). Officer Wyant yelled to defendant to stop, but defendant continued running (R. 
286:96, 142-43). Defendant ran about thirty feet before the officers caught up to him (R. 
286:134). When the officers came within three to four feet of defendant, he stopped and 
said, "I give, I give" (R. 286:96,134). The officers arrested defendant (R. 286:96,134,143). 
The evidence reasonably established that defendant knew that the officers were trying 
to arrest or detain him: Upon Officer Wyant's opening the shaving kit, defendant suddenly 
and emphatically demanded the kit, denied ownership of the undisclosed, illegal contents, 
and then fled when Officer Wyant directed Deputy Knighton, by word and gesture, to detain 
him. Also, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant heard Officer Wyant 
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order Deputy Knighton to detain defendant because defendant was only six feet from Officer 
Wyant when the command to detain him was given (R. 286:94). Finally, his statements, "I 
give, I give," when officers caught up to him suggest that defendant intended to evade arrest 
until it became clear that he could not outrun the officers. 
Defendant refused "to perform [an] act required by lawful order," in two ways. First, 
by fleeing, he refused to remain at the scene so that Deputy Knighton could arrest him. 
Defendant heard the order and was thereby required to remain at the scene so that Deputy 
Knighton could effectuate the arrest.9 Second, he refused to heed Officer Wyant's command 
to stop. Defendant was less than thirty feet from Officer Wyant and the Officer "yelled" to 
defendant to stop (R. 286:96). 
In sum, the State provided some evidence supporting each element of the interference 
charge. This evidence was uncontroverted when defendant moved for a directed verdict on 
the possession charges, and remained uncontroverted at the close of trial when defendant 
presented no witness of his own. Therefore, because a motion challenging the evidence of 
the interference charge would have been futile, defendant was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel's decision to not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that charge. 
9
 Defendant has a duty not to flee when he knows that he is under arrest. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3) (1999) (arrested person must refrain from acts which impede 
arrest). Therefore, where defendant is aware of an order to arrest him, and flees, he has 
"refused to perform an act required by a lawful order." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) 
(1999). 
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POINT II 
THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION WAS PROPER BECAUSE IT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND BORE A RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE CHARGED CRIMES 
Defendant claims that the flight instruction, attached at Addendum A, was improper 
under a four part test from the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Aplt. Br. at 18. 
Defendant asserts that the flight instruction, "although worded so as to remind the jury that 
flight is consistent with innocence as well as guilt, rang a bell that lingered in the jury's 
mind: that Dupont fled and therefore must be guilty of something " Aplt. Br. at 21. 
Defendant provides no justification for the court to enlarge already well-established 
Utah case law on flight instructions with a test from the Fifth Circuit. The question of the 
propriety of the flight instruction is easily resolved under current law, and this Court should 
therefore decline to consider the Fifth Circuit test. 
A flight instruction is appropriate when it is supported by the evidence and "4bear[s] 
a relationship to evidence reflected in the record/" State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, f 9,987 
P.2d 1281 (quoting State v. Pecheco, 495 P.2d 808, 808 (Utah 1972)). A flight instruction 
is supported by the evidence if the evidence of flight presented at trial is not slight or 
contradictory. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983). A flight instruction bears a 
relationship to the evidence in the record if the jury could logically infer consciousness of 
guilt about the charged crimes from defendant's flight. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, at ^11. 
This Court expressly approved the exact language of the flight instruction given in this case 
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mRiggs. 1999UTApp271,at«I 10. 
The evidence of flight is ample and undisputed. Defendant recognized that Officer 
Wyant had found drugs in his shave kit. As discussed above, Pt. I.C., defendant likely heard 
Officer Wyant order Deputy Knighton to detain him (R. 286:94, 132-33, 142). Defendant 
immediately fled and continued running despite Officer Wyant's command to stop (R. 
286:96, 143). 
The flight instruction was related to the charged crimes. Defendant's flight occurred 
after defendant recognized that Officer Wyant had discovered the drugs and after defendant 
heard Officer Wyant instruct Deputy Knighton to detain him (R. 286:94-96,142-43). A jury 
thus could logically conclude that defendant fled because of a guilty mind concerning 
possession of a controlled substance and knowledge that he was about to be arrested. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's conviction. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /& day of July, 2002 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered to Catherine E. Lilly, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorneys for 
appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /& day of July, 
2002. 
23 
Addendum A 
INSTRUCTION NO. V^ 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime or 
after that person is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the defendant's guilt. However, such flight, if proved, may be considered by you in 
light of all other proven facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not necessarily 
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with 
innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and the 
significance, if any, to be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within the 
province of the jury. 
